Netanyahu failed and must resign

Hamas’s calamitous Oct. 7 attack upon Israel will serve as the subject of research, study and analysis for decades. Understanding how the Palestinian Islamist group used low-technology systems to pull off the most savage attack on Israel in 50 years will take time and space from the event and the ongoing conflict.

It will also take some study to determine how Israeli intelligence failed so catastrophically. Likewise, a complete analysis of the Israel Defense Forces’ misunderstanding of Hamas’s intentions and capabilities requires a full investigation.

There is one judgment, however, that requires no further inquiry: Benjamin Netanyahu must not remain Israel’s prime minister. This failure is on his hands, and he cannot serve the people of Israel beyond the immediate moment.

History offers an awful point of reference. The parallels between this moment and the Oct. 6, 1973 attack by a coalition of Arab states on Israel that expelled the Israeli prime minister are achingly, blindingly apparent. At that time, despite numerous warnings of impending attacks from neighboring countries and even from allies such as the United States, Prime Minister Golda Meir and her cabinet did nothing. A sense of Israeli invincibility, combined with a dismissal of intelligence, led to a devastating attack and a war that forever altered Israel’s perception of its place in the region.

In 1973, the Israel Defense Forces beat back the Arab forces during the 18-day Yom Kippur War that followed the initial blow. Nonetheless, Meir’s tenure was over. She faced significant criticism for ignoring warnings from King Hussein of Jordan about a looming war with Egypt and Syria. Meir’s government withered under intense scrutiny and public demand for accountability. An investigation into the attack, revealing a lack of foresight and military readiness, swept her out of office. Rightly so.

The failures manifest in the present scenario are worse. This time, the attack was planned and rehearsed right under the noses of IDF security, with Hamas fighters training for the assault in plain sight. Despite intelligence indications pointing towards a possible Hamas offensive, Israel was underprepared and caught off guard. This time, multiple indications of a looming attack went unheeded. The pieces of a gruesome, multi-front attack were there, but no one put the puzzle together.

The IDF picked up indicators of Hamas repositioning for an assault the day prior to the attack, but leadership refused to increase alert or defense levels. As in 1973, Israel received warnings from outside the country: Cairo, for example, presented senior Israeli leadership with multiple warnings in the weeks ahead of the attack.

Further, Hamas signaled its intentions in the lead-up to Oct. 7. Six weeks before the attack, Saleh al-Arouri, the group’s deputy leader stationed in Beirut, conveyed to Lebanese media outlet Al Mayadeen that Israeli government actions were exacerbating tensions in the West Bank, and that consequently Hamas was preparing for a prolonged ground war. The article’s headline, quoting al-Arouri, unequivocally declares Hamas’s intent: “preparing for an all-out war.”

The response from Israeli media since the attack has been swift. Shortly after the Hamas raid into Israel, the editorial board of Ha’aretz, Israel’s oldest daily newspaper, squarely placed the responsibility for the attack on Netanyahu. The weight of this criticism intensified when Ha’aretz published a damning editorial titled “Netanyahu: Resign Now!” The piece went so far as to label the recent surprise attack on Israel as “the worst failure in the country’s history,” surpassing the 1973 missteps.

It is extraordinary for a national newspaper of Ha’aretz’s stature to demand the resignation of a sitting prime minister. But so, too is the enormity of the intelligence lapses and the implications for Israel’s security and future.

Democratic leaders traditionally face an uptick in support immediately after a national crisis, particularly an attack on sovereign land that requires a robust military response. Consider Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky, or George W. Bush right after 9/11. In political science this is known as the “rally around the flag phenomenon.” While the effect is often overstated and the improved opinion is generally mild, national leaders rarely lose public support in the early moments of a national conflict.

In contrast, inside Israel, Netanyahu faces near-universal contempt, his support imploding even among his own Likud Party’s faithful. Virtually all (95 percent) of surveyed Jewish Israelis believe the Hamas raid signifies a failure by Netanyahu’s government. Shockingly, this sentiment even encompasses 93 percent of those who previously supported his right-wing coalition.

Similarly, a recent poll by the daily Israeli newspaper Maariv suggests a swing in voter intentions, favoring an opposition alliance led by Benny Gantz, with 48 percent preferring Gantz over Netanyahu’s 29 percent for the prime ministerial role.

Well before the Oct. 7 attacks, Netanyahu was already unpopular with many segments of the population. A proposal to diminish the Supreme Court’s power to challenge laws enacted by the Israeli Knesset led to widespread national demonstrations, with fears that Netanyahu’s conservative alliance would enact increasingly strict laws without adequate checks and balances. Now, in a moment when Israel must rally together against a vile enemy, the prime minister has virtually no public support.

Netanyahu has always wanted to be remembered as “the protector of Israel.” This is something he says frequently. Yet, after his government failed to keep Israel safe, Netanyahu refuses any responsibility.

In moments of crisis, a leader’s mettle is tested by his ability to respond and willingness to accept responsibility. In such moments, a citizenry must be able to trust its leadership. Right now, Israel has no effective, trusted leadership at the top.

This moment requires more than just strength and anger. It demands foresight, humility and the moral fortitude to admit mistakes. Meir recognized this when she stepped down. History now beckons Netanyahu. But because he lacks Meir’s introspection, clarity of thought and moral compass, it’s hard to foresee Netanyahu resigning.

He has failed to demonstrate responsibility. He will undoubtedly cast blame about: on Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, on Director of the Israel Security Agency Ronen Bar, on IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. And these three men must all go away in disgrace. To their credit, however, they have all done something their prime minister has not in publicly accepting responsibility.

Golda Meir’s resignation in the wake of the Yom Kippur War sets a precedent. Leaders are not just strategists and commanders; they are the embodiment of a nation’s spirit and its moral compass. A leader who cannot look into his own soul and accept responsibility for mistakes, and correct course during times of adversity, fails not only his position but also his people.

Healing, grieving and navigating whatever comes next will require leadership that understands these principles. Netanyahu must step aside and let a new chapter of leadership begin.

Joe Buccino, a retired U.S. Army colonel and former U.S. Central Command communications director, serves as an A.I. research analyst with the U.S. Department of Defense Defense Innovation Board. His views do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other organization.