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The writer is editorial director and a columnist at Le Monde
At the end of a lecture on history and freedom delivered last week in a magnificent 19th-century hall at the Sorbonne university in Paris, the American historian Timothy Snyder had this message for Europeans: if a ceasefire agreement is reached in Ukraine, “you should throw in everything you have to Ukraine — EU membership, troops, massive investment. Otherwise you will live in the shadow of war permanently. This is the hour of Europe, because the US will do nothing.”
Emmanuel Macron does not need to be convinced. In Europe, the conversation on Russia’s war in Ukraine has brutally shifted. Donald Trump’s return to the White House and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s opening towards a negotiated settlement have created a new, more volatile situation. Supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes”, the allies’ mantra for almost three years, does lose credibility when the major partner leaves the chorus. Trump’s willingness to end the war, while keeping the Europeans in the dark over how he intends to do so, poses an enormous challenge to the leaders of the continent.
The French president’s worst nightmare, shared by many of his counterparts, is a Russian-American deal done over the heads of Ukrainians and Europeans — an American diplomatic tradition which, to be fair, predates Trump. Macron scored an early victory when he set up a meeting between Zelenskyy and then president-elect Trump on the margins of the reopening of the newly restored Notre-Dame Cathedral in December. This conversation apparently helped Trump to realise that solving the problem would take more than 24 hours. European officials also point out, somehow reassuringly, that the US president has — so far — avoided hair-raising, Gaza-like scenarios about Ukraine. His line, they believe, has not yet been set, as Russian president Vladimir Putin still seems to think he can win this war.
One line they know to be clear, however, is that of American disengagement. There’s no need to leave Nato — Trump just does not want his country to be burdened with a war in Ukraine. If Europe wants a seat at the negotiating table, it must have something to put on it so that its interests are taken into account regarding not only the terms of the deal but also its implementation. A deal that may look good to Trump because it stops the slaughter of “young, beautiful people” will not be a good deal for Europe if it does not prevent Putin from attacking Ukraine again. From a European point of view, strong security guarantees for Kyiv are therefore key to any agreement.
This is where things get painful for countries that for decades have outsourced their security to the US and now belatedly realise that this guarantee is gone. A “very dynamic debate” is going on, according to a European official, about what security guarantees would be necessary. Among the most determined countries in this debate — which includes Poland, the Baltics, Sweden and Finland — France is trying to play a leading role, though in a new, unfamiliar mode: by rallying others and keeping the different pieces of the puzzle together rather than by playing its own card.
New formats, outside the EU if need be, such as adding Italy and the UK to the “Weimar triangle” of France, Germany and Poland, have been put to work. Humbled by the adverse reaction a year ago to his surprise proposal for putting western “boots on the ground” in Ukraine, Macron, who is presumably also aware of his weakened position on the European scene due to his domestic political and economic travails, has some work to do to regain his partners’ trust.
Yet France is in a singular position when it comes to facing an American president who may behave more as an adversary than as an ally. For some Europeans, particularly those most exposed to the Russian threat, the possibility of the fall of Ukraine is a terrifying prospect, as they would find themselves next in line. The temptation to try to keep American protection at any cost would therefore run counter to the effort of building a strong European defence capability. France does not share the same sensitivity because it feels protected by its own independent nuclear deterrent.
Snyder’s words at the Sorbonne echo those of Mark Rutte, the Nato secretary-general, who warned members of the European parliament last month that if EU member states do not drastically increase their defence spending, the only options left to them will be to learn Russian or move to New Zealand. Caught between Putin and Trump, Europeans are finally facing the reality they have tried to escape for so long.
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