It has become clear that a Ukrainian “victory” that results in recovery of the territory lost to Russia since 2014 is unlikely. As the conflict in Ukraine drags on, with negotiations for even a cease-fire at a virtual standstill, peacekeeping is being touted as a solution to this conflict.
Senior allied defense officials met in the U.K. on March 20 to discuss the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” for peacekeeping. Yet as Bence Németh of King’s College London has noted: “European leaders say they will only send troops if there is a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far ruled out signing a peace deal that includes Western forces in Ukraine.”
The reason peacekeeping cannot be a panacea is that its success depends on the existence of a treaty or other agreement that establishes a peace to be kept. The prospect of a peacekeeping mission might build confidence to increase the likelihood of a peace agreement between warring parties, but peacekeeping follows an agreement. It cannot compel an agreement.
Defending NATO territory through deterrence by force posture in Europe and NATO nuclear policy is possible, and quite likely to succeed, under current actions and planning. But this essentially defensive approach should not be confused with offensive (or counteroffensive, if one prefers) actions to regain Ukrainian territory seized by Russia.
Unless members of NATO are willing to impose their will upon Russia with the full application of all elements of national power — an extremely risky endeavor given Russian nuclear capability — the decision to stop the war against Ukraine remains primarily with Putin.
If a peace agreement in the current war between Russia and Ukraine comes to fruition, could, should, or would NATO provide a peacekeeping force? A peacekeeping force might make a mutually acceptable agreement between Ukraine and Russia more likely, and an agreement might be concluded before both countries suffer tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, more casualties in exchange for only minor changes in the front lines.
Some allies have implied that NATO members would provide the bulk of the hypothetical 30,000 soldier peacekeeping force.
Using the 1,165-member Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai as an example, a force this size to monitor compliance with a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement is theoretically plausible. Employing troops from 13 nations, it covers a boundary zone approximately 200 kilometers long and 40 kilometers in depth. Sources vary and the conflict is dynamic, but for purposes of comparison, the front between Russia and Ukraine is between 1,000 and 1,600 kilometers. Yet it is worth noting Egypt and Israel have no desire to change the status quo of their border following their 1979 peace treaty, so the Sinai observers need not enforce it.
There are some realities to consider regarding proposals for a NATO peacekeeping force.
First, one should recognize that NATO is not a party to the conflict. Individual member states are providing assistance to Ukraine. NATO is not doing so as an organization, although it does provide a forum for members to coordinate national support. It would be astonishing if all 32 members agreed to collectively assume a NATO peacekeeping mission.
Second, it would be even more astonishing if Russia would agree. One of Putin’s excuses for invading Ukraine again has been to create a buffer zone between Russia and NATO members. Allowing NATO members to put a sizable number of military troops inside Ukraine would seem directly contrary to Putin’s image of Russian security. Why would he accept this condition when he apparently believes he now holds the “winning hand” and feels no urgency to reach a peace agreement?
Third, assuming a requirement for 30,000 peacekeeping troops and Putin’s acquiescence, where would these forces come from? It does not seem likely the allies could produce this number in the near-term in addition to those already committed to deterring Russia from within NATO member boundaries. (Note that peacekeeping forces must remain neutral. Lightly armed only for self-defense, they could not provide effective deterrence other than the possibility of serving as a “tripwire” to initiate the commitment of additional NATO forces.)
Although NATO might be the best organized and most experienced entity for leading a peacekeeping mission of this size and complexity, for the reasons described above, that is not a feasible solution. Approaches more likely to be acceptable to Putin could be a UN peacekeeping mission or an organization specifically created for the purpose of maintaining an agreement between Russia and Ukraine. China and/or India might be significant force contributors.
Some NATO members apparently desire to be involved in a peacekeeping mission. Nonetheless, remaining outside of an agreement between Russia and Ukraine could have a positive aspect for NATO. Tactically and strategically, it may be wiser to employ additional troops to beef up the defense of the NATO members near to Russia instead of using them to perform peacekeeping within Ukraine.
Christopher M. Schnaubelt, PhD, is a former dean of the NATO Defense College. A retired U.S. Army officer, he served on deployments to Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan and participated in three multinational peacekeeping exercises in Ukraine.
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