In a current submit, I wrote about how I organized the Fourth Modification “search” supplies for the forthcoming sixteenth version of the Kamisar LaFave & Israel Prison Process casebook. Now I need to cowl the flip facet: After getting coated the regulation of searches and seizures (Chapter 6), how do you current the regulation of when searches and seizures are unreasonable — and subsequently unconstitutional (Chapter 7)? As with searches, I will begin with why it is actually onerous to determine the perfect method. Then I will flip to my method.
First, the problem. Instructing the regulation of when searches and seizures are unreasonable (and subsequently unconstitutional) may be very tough due to the size of the issue. Understanding reasonableness requires mastering a large variety of circumstances, a large variety of doctrines, and an extremely wide selection of details —all of that are linked to one another. There are effectively over 100 vital Supreme Courtroom circumstances to cowl, in further to tons of vital lower-court circumstances to contemplate; numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement to be taught; how the exceptions to the warrant requirement apply typically depends upon the context (for search incident to arrest, for instance, there’s one rule for folks, one other for locations, and a 3rd rule for vehicles); some doctrines themselves divide into many sub-doctrines (exigent circumstances may be about proof destruction, or scorching pursuit, or emergency support); and a few doctrines apply throughout completely different contexts and others do not (consent applies broadly, whereas group caretaking is just for vehicles). Some are brilliant line guidelines; others are obscure requirements. Some are rooted in historical past, others are fairly new. To high it off, most of the doctrines are controversial and have to be handled with cautious context, corresponding to cease and frisk, extreme pressure, and the knock-and-announce rule.
How on earth do you cowl all of that? The place do you even begin? How are you going to current supplies that construct a whole image of the related regulation, presenting ideas in an order that builds step-by-step by the very fact patterns and ideas and generational improvement and doctrine? It is onerous.
This is the method I took for the brand new sixteenth version.
The primary subject is the regulation related to acquiring and executing search warrants. It begins with the regulation of possible trigger, with the principle circumstances being Illinois v. Gates (possible trigger to go looking) and Maryland v. Pringle (possible trigger to arrest), as they’re within the present casebook. Then the supplies current the foundations for acquiring warrants and the foundations for executing warrants, together with the knock-and-announce rule (coated with United States v. Banks as the principle case). As a result of the regulation of executing warrants is intrinsically linked to the plain view exception, and but plain view additionally applies within the warrantless part and is nice to know on the outset, this part additionally features a plain view exception subsection, utilizing the principle case of Arizona v. Hicks. The aim of this primary part is to cowl basic search warrant doctrine, making the warrant-related doctrines a type of reference level for the remainder of the chapter’s dialogue of warrantless reasonableness doctrines.
With the regulation of warrants below our belts, the chapter then turns to the first guidelines of reasonableness that apply within the 4 primary classes of Fourth Modification searches and seizures: searches and seizures of (1) houses, (2) containers, (3) vehicles, and (4) individuals. As Fourth Modification nerds know, the regulation of reasonableness typically applies in another way in these 4 settings. So to get grounded, particularly within the warrantless context, you must soar into the regulation of reasonableness in these 4 distinct settings — studying the principle exceptions to the warrant requirement that come up in these settings. (As an apart, this additionally occurs to virtually completely observe the language of the Fourth Modification— which gives rights in opposition to unreasonable searches and seizures of “individuals, homes, papers, and results”—though, maybe surprisingly, the Courtroom has not rooted this distinct remedy by reference to the constitutional textual content.)
The present model of the casebook has that primary method, however I reordered it and added a piece on containers, the fourth class. I made a decision to begin with the regulation of home searches as a result of its the basic truth sample that impressed the enactment of the Fourth Modification; it is the reference level from earlier supplies on warrants and possible trigger; and most of the exceptions to the warrant requirement have been launched in that setting.
Inside the regulation of home searches, there are three subsections. We begin with the essential warrant requirement with Payton v. New York—and, within the notes, associated circumstances. The second subsection covers the regulation of exigent circumstances, utilizing Warden v. Hayden and Kentucky v. King as essential circumstances. The third subsection addresses the search incident to arrest doctrine, that includes Chimel v. California. The aim of this part is to cowl the principle guidelines for looking out homes; to see how the warrant requirement typically applies; and to additionally introduce the principle exceptions to the warrant requirement that may apply in the home setting, exigent circumstances and search incident to arrest.
Subsequent up is a really brief part on the reasonableness guidelines for containers. If a container is outdoors a home, corresponding to an merchandise of mail, or a suitcase, or a handbag, does the warrant requirement nonetheless apply? And may or not it’s detained quickly, and if that’s the case, when? I assumed it helpful to cowl these points in a brief however distinct part after home searches, with United States v. Chadwick as a essential case, is it begins the dialogue of how far warrants ought to go and in addition units up the necessity distinction with automotive searches and seizures within the subsequent part.
As talked about, the following part is on automotive seizures and searches. Right here the Supreme Courtroom has given the police loads of energy to go looking and seize, in appreciable distinction to homes and containers. The part explores these doctrines and considers how they distinction with residence/container circumstances, on what justification, and what the boundaries are between the automotive doctrines and the home/container circumstances. It begins with the regulation of stopping vehicles, overlaying Whren v. United States and the regulation of site visitors stops (with notes on what’s permitted throughout a cease and the way lengthy they’ll go). Subsequent up is the auto exception, with the principle circumstances being California v. Carney (exploring the road between homes and vehicles) and California v. Acavedo (exploring the road between vehicles and containers). Then we cowl searches of a automotive incident to arrest, with Arizona v. Gant the principle case.
The supplies then cowl seizures and searches of individuals. First up is the regulation of arrest, with the principle circumstances being United States Watson (with notes on Gerstein and County of Riverside) on the trigger and judicial evaluate necessities, and Atwater v. Metropolis of Lago Vista (with notes on Moore) on what crimes can result in arrest. The supplies then cowl search incident to arrest for individuals, with Robinson as the principle case and Riley because the lead be aware in distinction. The supplies then cowl search and seizure after arrest, with notes on subsequent DNA checks, strip searches, and the like.
With that primary algorithm achieved, and with the regulation of arrests and particular person searches recent, the supplies then flip to cease and frisk. The cease and frisk supplies are divided into 5 components: first, an introduction that includes Terry v. Ohio and a abstract of the essential doctrine; subsequent, caselaw on cheap suspicion to cease (with Illinois v. Wardlow and Kansas v. Glover as the principle circumstances); third, a brief subsection on what can occur throughout a Terry cease and the way lengthy they’ll go; fourth, a brief subsection on trigger to frisk; and fifth, a piece on how far frisks can lengthen (with Minnesota v. Dickerson as the principle case). All through there may be dialogue of how the foundations work collectively and empirical research of their workings, quite a few which give attention to racial disparities in cease and frisk practices. The distinction with the regulation of arrest is designed to maintain an implicit query in thoughts; is permitting lesser stops and lesser searches based mostly on lesser trigger constant or inconsistent with earlier doctrines, such because the regulation of arrests and the regulation of car stops? How a lot energy do the police have, and which doctrines are giving it to them?
With cease and frisk now below our belt, the supplies flip to the regulation of extreme pressure. Extreme pressure is split into two components. The primary half is the doctrinal framework for when pressure is extreme, with Graham v. Connor as the principle case and notes on the foremost Supreme Courtroom selections and summaries of lower-court guidelines and requirements on this query. The second half is the regulation of certified immunity, with Metropolis of Tahlequah v. Bond as the principle case and notes on how certified immunity works, views about its reform, and the like.
Nearly achieved, I promise! There are simply two subjects to go. The following one up is administrative searches and the particular wants exception. There are loads of circumstances on this space, however they’re all thematically associated, so this part takes the view which you could examine one and get notes summarizing the foundations for a way the others apply. The one truth sample studied in additional element right here is drunk driving checkpoints, with the principle case being Michigan Division of State Police v. Sitz. Notes cowl different conditions, like border search guidelines; probation searches; nationwide safety searches; security inspections; authorities workplaces, and many others.
Final up is the regulation of consent searches, which is split into two sections. It begins with the consent customary below Schneckloth, with notes on subjects just like the pscyhology of consent, empirical research, the scope of consent below Jimeno, and the like. The final subsection is on third-party consent, with the principle case being Fernandez v. California (which has helpful discussions of Matlock and Randolph) and notes explaining the scope of third-party consent in frequent conditions in addition to the obvious authority doctrine. The final be aware then brings the chapter full circle to the start, asking college students to contemplate what makes a search and seizure cheap. Is there actually a warrant requirement, with just a few “restricted” exceptions? Is all of it about reasonableness balancing, with warrants solely being reserved for just a few conditions? Or is it a unusual historic mixture of the 2?
